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l\1r. Viviani declared that the French delegation would be composed of l\1r. Sarraut, Mr. Jusserand, and Admiral de Bon.
The chairman said that the meeting of this committee would be
~object to the call of the Chair.
The meeting then adjourned.

~OURTH

!'fEETING, COLUMBUS ROOM, PAN AMERICAN UNION BUILDING, THURSDAY, DECEMBER 22, 1921, 11 A. M.
PRESENT.

United States.-l\1r. Hughes, Senator Lodge, Mr. Root, Senator
Underwood, Col. Roosevelt, Admiral Coontz. Accompanied by
l\1r. "\Vright, Mr. Clark.
British En~pire.-l\1r. Balfour, Lord Lee, Sir Auckland Geddes,
Rear Admiral Sir E. Chatfield, Sir Robert Borden (for Canada),
Senator Pearce (for Australia), Sir John Salmond (for New Zealand), l\1r. Sastri (for India). Accompanied by Sir Maurice
Hankey, Capt. Little, Capt. Domvile, Mr. Mousl~y.
France.-l\1r. Sarrant, Mr. Jusserand, Vice Admiral de Bon.
Accompanied by Mr. Kammerer, l\1r. Denaint, Capt. Odend'hal,
:Mr. Ponsot.
Jtaly.-Senator Schanzer, Senator Rolandi-Ricci, Senator Albertini, Vice Admiral Baron Acton. Accompanied by Marquis Visconti-Venosta, Commander Prince Ruspoli, Mr. Celesia di Veg. .
lias co.
Japan.-Prince Tokugawa, Mr. Hanihara, Vice Admiral Kato,
Capt. Uyeda. Accompanied by 1\tlr. Ichihashi, Commander Hori.
The secretary general, assisted by Mr. Cresson, Mr. Pierrepont,
and Mr. Wilson; interpreters, Mr. Camerlynck and Mr. Talamon.
1. The fourth meeting of the Committee on Limitation of Armament was held in the Columbus Room of the Pan American Union
Building on Thursday, December 221 1921, at 11 a. m.
2. There were present: For the United States, Mr. Hughes,
Senator Lodge, Mr. Root, Senator Underwood, CoL Roosevelt, AdJpiral Coontz; for the British Empire, Mr. Balfour, Lord Lee, Sir
Auckland Geddes, Rear Admiral ~ir E. Chatfield, Sir Robert
Borden (for Canada), Senator Pearce (for Australia), Sir John
Salmond (for New Zealand), l\1r. Sastri (for India) ; for France,
Mr. Sarraut, Mr. .Jusserand, Vice Admiral de Bon; for Italy, Senator Schanzer, Senator Rolandi-Ricci, Senator Albertini, Vice Admiral Acton; for Japan, Prince Tokugawa, Mr. Hanihara, Vice
Admiral Kato, Capt. Uyeda.
3. The following secretaries and technical advisers were present: For the United States, Mr. Wright, Mr. Clark; for the British Empire, Sir Maurice Hankey, Capt. Little, Capt. Domvile, 1_\,lr.
~ousley; for Fr:ance, Mr. Kammerer, l\1r. Denaint, Capt. .Odepd-
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'hal, Mr. Ponsot ; for Italy, Marquis Visconti-Venosta, Commander
Prince Ruspoli, Mr. * Celesia di Vegliasco; for .Japan, l\1r. Ichihashi, Cornman der Hori. The secretary general, accompanied by
Mr. Cresson, Mr. Pierrepont, and l\1r. Wilson, was present. Mr.
Camerlynck and l\Ir. Talamon were present as interpreters.
4. The chairman, l\tlr. Hughes, opened the meeting by saying
that, as the members of the committee would recall, at the first
meeting of this Committee on the Limitation of Armament a subcommittee, consisting of technical experts, ·had been appointed
for the purpose of giving information and advice in connection
with the proposal formulated by the American Government and
any other matters that might be considered pertinent. That committee had proceeded with its deliberations. Conversations bet'v~en the heads of the United States, British Empire, and .Japanese delegations with respect to the definite proposals for the
limitation of the capital ships of those three nations had followed.
An agreement had been reached between the three powers concerning their capital ships, which, however, was a provisional one,
so far as the number of capital ships to be scrapped and the number to be retained was concerned, depending for its final and
definite adoption upon the future action of France and Italy.
The chairman stated that it had been found advisable to enlarge the subcommittee, which, it would be recalled, was originally
composed_ exclusively of naval experts, in effect forming a new
subcommittee· in its place; this new subrommittee had been composed of one delegate for each of the fi\Ve powers, together with
one naval expert and one -civilian (who might be a delegate or
not), so that expert and political opinions might be more closely
related.
The chairman was glad to say that at the first meeting of this
new subcommittee (which had been called the subcommittee of
fifteen on naval limitation), he had been able to announce that
an agreement, provisional while awaiting the decision of France
and Italy, had been reached between the delegations of the United
States, the British Empire, and .Japan. This agreement being
familiar to all, he did not wish to take time to read it, but desired
to have it incorporated in the records of this committee, as though
it had been stated in full, as follows :
"The following are the points of agreement that have been
reached in the course of the negotiations between the United
States of America, Great Britain, and .Japan with respect to their
capital fighting ships.
"An agreement has been reached between the three powers-the
United States of America, the British Empire, and .Japan--on
the subject of naval ratio. The proposal of the American Gov·
ernment that the ratio should be 5: 5: 3 is accepted. It is agreed
tbat with respect to fortifications and naval bases in the Pacific
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region, including Hongkong, the status quo shall be maintainedthat is, that there shall be no increase in these fortifications and
naval bases except that this restriction shall not apply to the
Hawaiian Islands, Australia, New Zealand, and the islands composing Japan proper, or, of course, to the coasts of the Unit~d
States and Canada, as to which the respective powers retain their
entire freedom.
"The Japanese Government has found special difficulty with
respect to the Mutsu, as that is their newest ship. In order to
retain the Mutsu Japan has proposed to scrap the Settsu, one of
her older ships, which, under the American proposal, was to have
been retained. This would leave the numb~r of Japan's capital
ships the same--that is, 10, as under the American proposal. The
retention of ·the Mutsu by Japan in place of the Settsu makes a
difference in net tonnage of 13,600 tons, making the total tonnage
of Japan's capital ships 313,300 tons, as against 299,700 tons under
the original American proposal.
"While the difference in tonnage is small; t~ere would be considerable difference in efficiency, as the retention of the Mutsu
would give Japan two post-Jutland ships of the latest design.
" In order to meet this situation and to preserve the relative
strength on the basis of the agreed ratio, it is agreed that the
United States shall complete two of the ships in course of construction-that is, the Colorado and the Washington-which are
now about 90 per cent completed, and scrap two of the older
ships-that is, the North Dakota and the Delaware-which, under
the original proposal, were to be retained. This would leave the
United States with the same number of capital ships-that is, 18,
as under the original proposal-with a tonnage of 525,850 tons,
as against 500,650 tons as originally proposed. Three of the ships
would be post-Jutland ships of the Marryland type.
"As the British have no post-Jutland ships, except one Hood,
the construction of which is only partly post-Jutland, it is agreed
that in order to maintain proper relative strength the British
Government may construct two new ships not to exceed 35,000
legend tons each; that is, calculating the tonnage according to
British standards of measurement, or, according to American calculations, the equivalent of 37,000 tons each.
"It is agreed that the British Government shall, on the completion of these two new ships, scrap four of their ships of the
King George V type-that is, the Erin, King George V, Centurion,
and Ajax, which were to have been retained under the original
American proposal. This would leave the British capital ships
in number 20, as against 22 under the American proposal. Taking the tonnage of the two new ships according to American calculations, it would amount to 74,000, and the four ships scrapped,
having a tonnage of 96,000 tons, there would be a reduction in
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net tonnage of 22,400 tons, leaving the British tonnage of capital
ships 582,050 instead of 604,450. This ~ould give the British as
against the United States an excess tonnage of 56,200 tons, which
is deemed to be fair, in vie·w of the age of the ships of the Royal
Sovereign and the Queen El·izabeth types.
"The maximum limitation for the tonnage of ships to be constructed in replacement is to be fixed at 35,000 legend tons-that
is, according to British standards of measurement, or, according
to American calculations, the equivalent of 37,000 tons-in order
to give accommodation to these changes. The maximum tonnage
of capital ships is fixed, for the purpose of replacement, on the
basis of American standards of calculation, as follows:
Tons.
United States------------------------------------- 525, 000
Great Britain---------------·~--------------------...:. 525, 000
Japan-------------------------------------------- 315,000

"Comparing this arrangement with the original American proposal, it "'~in be observed that the United States is to scrap 30
ships as proposed, save that there will be scrapped 13 of the 15
ships under construction and 17 instead of 15 of the older ships.
" The total tonnage of the American capital ships to be scrapped
under the original proposal, including the tonnage of ships in
construction if completed, was stated to be 845,740 tons. Under
the present arrangement the tonnage of the 30 ships to be
scrapped, taking that of the ships in construction if completed,
would be 820,540 tons.
" The number of the Japanese ships to be retained remains
the same as under the original proposal. The total tonnage of
the ships to be scrapped by Japan under the o~iginal American
proposal, taking the tonnage of new ships when completed, was
stated to be 448,928 tons. The total tonnage of the ships to be
scrapped under the present arrangement is 435,328 tons.
"Under the original proposal Great Britain was to scrap 19
capital ships (including certain predreadnaughts already.
scrapped), \vhereas under the present arrangement she will scrap
4 mor~, or a total of 23. The total tonnage of ships to be
scrapped by Great Britain, including the tonnage of the four
Hoods, to which the proposal referred as laid down, if completed,
was stated to be 583,375 tons. The corresponding t~tal of scrapped
ships under the ne:w arrangement will be 22,600 tons more, or
605,975 tons.
" Under the American proposal there \vere to be scrapped 66
capital fighting ships built and building, with a total tonnage
(taking ships ·laid down as completed) of 1,878,043 tons. Under
the present arrangement, on the same basis of calculation, there
are to be scrapped 68 capital fighting ships, with a tonnage of
1,861,643 tons.
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"The naval holiday of 10 years with respect to capital ships,
as originally proposed by the American Government, is to be maintained ex~ept for the permission to construct ships as above
stated.
"This arrangement between the United States, Great Britain,
and Japan is, ·so far as the number of ships to be retained and
scrapped is concerned, dependent upon a suitable agreement with
France and Italy as to their capital ships, a matter which is now
in course of negotiation."
The chairman, continuing, reported that the subcommittee of
fifteen on naval limitation had proceeded to consider the question
of capital ship tonnage with regard to France and Italy. Admiral
de Bon had very eloquently presented a proposal on behalf of the
French Government which had been discussed. He would not attempt to describe the course of that discussion. It would be sufficient for him to say that there had been a discusssion of the
French desire to be free to build 10 capital ships of 35,000 tons
each. The American .delegation had stated its understanding that
the present composition of France's first line navy was 7 capital
ships, totaling 164,000 tons, and 3 predreadnaughts, giving an approximate total tonnage of 221,000 tons. He had pointed out
that the other Governments had agreed to scrap their predreadnaughts without planning to replace them. Apart from this, the
agreement to scrap capital ship tonnage represented for the three
powers a cut of about 40 per cent in their capital ship tonnage
exclusiYe of predreadnaughts. In the case of France, a similar
reduction would have meant a reduction to about 102,000 tons.
It had been considered fair not to ask so much of France, but that
she should be free to keep all of her 10 ships, including the .3 predreadnaughts. In replacing her old ships, however, France was
asked to keep her Navy down to 175,000 tons.
He had reported further that Italy had expressed the desire to
maintain a naval parity with France. Italy was perfectly satisfied ·with the limit of 175,000 tons for capital ships so long as
it applied equally to France and Italy. He had understood
that the French Government was also content with parity with
Italy. Admiral de Bon had, however, presented a complete statement of France's position, of her desire to be free to have 10
ships in the course of time to put her fleet on a footing she considered necessary and fitting, and to begin the 1~eplacement · of
her warships at an earlier date, due to the condition of her
dock~~ards and to the fact that she had already refrained from
building for some years.
· In vlew of his responsibilities as chairman and considering
that l\Ir. Briand had been present at the earlier sessions of the
conference and shown such a strong wish to ·see it succeed, he,
with the knowledge of the French . representative, had sent a

\.
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message to 1\Ir. Briand and received a reply. This correspondence
being familiar to all, he would regard it as now submitted and
ordered spread upon the records, as follows :
" DECEMBER 16, 1921.
" MY DEAR M. BRIAND : In view of your distinguished service
at the Conference· on Limitati~n of .Armament and of my responsibilities as chairman of the conference, I venture to address to
you this personal word. I am happy to say that the conversations
between the United States, Great Britain, and Japan as to the
proposal which I made on behalf of the ·American Government at
the opening of the conference with respect to capital ships have
resulted in a provisional agreement. Great Britain and Japan
have accepted the naval ratio as proposed and the reduction of
capital ships, with such modifications as do not seriously affect
the principle involved. Japan keeps the Mutsu and scraps the
Settsu. The United States finishes two ships, the Colorado and
the Washington, now about 90 per cent completed, and scraps the
North Dakota and Delaware. Great Britain will build two new
ships and scrap four, to wit, the Erin, King George V, Centurion,
and Ajam. The result is that the United States still scraps 30
ships-that is, 13 of the ships under construction and 17, instead
of 15, of the older ships, leaving the. number of ships the same
as under the original proposal, with a tonnage of 525,000 tons,
instead of 500,000 tons. Thus the United States scraps 322,000
tons of her ships (exclusive of predreadnaughts). Great Britain
and Japan scrap to an equivalent extent. Japan retains the
same number of ships as proposed and scraps 17 as proposed,
her new tonnage being 313,300, instead of about 300,000.
"Great Britain scraps 22,600 tons more than originally proposed, leaving her tonnage 582,000 instead of 604,400, her excess
being allowed in view of the age of her existing ships. The new
limits are very little different from those proposed, being 525,000
tons for the United States and Great Britain, and 315,000 tons
for Japan. The naval holiday as to capital ships is agreed upon
except for the construction of the ships above mentioned. In
short, under the original American proposal there were to be
scrapped by the three powers 66 capital fighting ships, built and
building, with ·a total tonnage (taking ships laid down as completed) of 1,878,000 tons. Under the present arrangement, on
the same basis of calculation, there are to be scrapped 68 capital
fighting ships, with a tonnage of 1,861,000 tons.
"You will thus observe that there has been simply a slight
readjustment in the three navies with respect to the ships re-.
tained, but that the sacrifices proposed by the American Government have substantially been made and the principle as laid down
is being carried out so far as these three po·wers are concerned.
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"The agreement, however, as to the number of ships to be
retained by them is dependent upon an appropriate agreement
'vith France and Italy with respect to their capital ships. Italy
is desirous to reduce her capital ships, because of the obvious
requirements of her economic life, to the lowest possible basis
and there will be not the slightest difficulty in making an agreement with Italy if we can reach a suitable understanding with
France.
"You will observe the attitude of France will determine the
success or failure of these efforts to reduce the heavy burden of
naval armament.
"In dealing with Great Britain and Japan we have taken facts
as they are. We have avoided an academic discussion of national
needs and aspirations which in the nature of things could not
be realized. It has been pointed out that the ratio of strength in
capital ships is that which exists and that it is futile to desire a
better one, for it can not be obtained if nations with abundant
resources build against each other in competition. The predreadnaughts possessed by the three powers are to be scrapped without
any suggestion of replacement, and there has been a reduction
of over 40 per cent of the naval strength represented by dreadnaughts and superdreadnaughts. Now, France has seven dreadnaughts, with a tonnage of 164,500. Reducing in the same proportion as the United States has reduced, her tonnage of capital
ships would be fixed at 102,000, or if the predreadnaughts of
France were taken into calculation on her side although omitted
on the side of the United States, the total tonnage of France's
capital ships being taken at 221,000, a reduction on the same basis
would reduce France to 136,000 tons.
" This would be the sacrifice of France if she made the same
sacrifices that have been made by the other powers. We do not
ask this. We are entirely willing that France should have the
benefit of an increased tonnage which would preclude the necessity of her scrapping her dreadnaughts; that is to say, her present strength in dreadnaughts is about 164,000 tons, and there is
not the slightest objection to allowing this and an increase over
this, or a total of 175,000 tons, which would be more than 70,000
tons over what she would have on the basis of relative strength as
it exists.
" If it be said that France desires a greater relative strength,
the obvious answer is that this would be impossible of attainment.
If such an agreement as we are now proposing were not made, the
United States and Great Britain would very shortly have navies
of over a million tons, more than 6 to 1 as compared with France,
and France would not be in a position to better herself, much less
by any possible endeavor to obtain such a relative strength as has
been suggested. In short, the proposed agreement is tremendously
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in favor of F'rance by reducing the navies of powers who not only
are able to build but whose ships are actually in course of construction to a basis far more favorable to France than would
otherwise be attainable. The proposed agreement really doubles
the relative strength of the French Navy.
"In these circumstances I feel that the suggestion that has been
made that France should build 10 new capital ships in replacement, with a tonnage of 300,000 tons or more, suggests a program
of such magnitude as to raise the greatest difficulties. In fact, I
regret to say that after canvassing the matter thoroughly and
taking the best information I can obtain, I am compelled to conclude that it would not be possible on this basis to carry through
the agreement.
"I need not point out to you our great desire, which you yourself have so eloquently expressed, that the economic burden of
armament should be lifted. It is not against the interests of
France that we express the hope that her industry and resources
will be devoted to economic recuperation and the enhancement of
her prosperity rather than be expended in the building of fighting
ships. The particular situation of France with respect to land
arma;ment you have vividly portrayed, but that points, as it seems
to us, to the very great importance of reduction in naval armament. At this time, when we are anxious to aid France in full
recovery of her economic life, it would be most disappointing to
be .... advised that she was contemplating putting hundreds of
millions into battleships.
" I have spoken to you thus frankly because of my deep appreciation of your friendship and of your solicitude for the success of
the efforts we are making, and in the hope that the present matter,
which represents perhaps the most critical P<?Sition yet reached in
the conference, may be adjusted on a satisfactory basis. I repeat
that the provisional agreement reached with Great Britain and
Japan hinges upon an appropriate agreement w:th France, and
I can not too strongly urge the most careful consideration of all
the matters to which I have taken the liberty to allude. Permit
me to assure you of my highest respect and of the keen desir(\
that we entertain in America that you should visit us again at
an early date.
"CHARLES E. HUGHES."
December 18, 1921.
"MY DEAR MR. HuGHEs: At the moment of my departure for
London, Mr. Herrick handed me your friendly telegram in regard
to the difficulties which have arisen in the Naval Disarmament
Commission in reference to the tonnage of capital ships which
have been asked for by the French delegation.
" LONDON,
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"You fear that the maintenance of this French request may
have as its effect to hinder the agreement between the five powers.
"The will of the French Government is to do everything which
is compatible with the care of the vital interests of France- with
a view to reconcile our points of view.
"In the question of naval armament, the preoccupation of
France is not the offensive point of view but uniquely the defensive point of view.
"With regard to the tonnage of capital ships-that is to say,
attacking ships, which are the most costly-! have given instructions to our delegates in the sense which you desire. I am certain
that I shall be sustained by my Parliament in this view.
" But so far as the defensive ships are concerned (light cruisers, torpedo boats, and submarines) it would be impossible for
the French Government, without putting itself in contradiction
with the vote of the chambers, to accept reductions corresponding
to those which we accept for capital ships under this formal reserve which you will certainly understand.
"The idea which dominates the Washington conference is to
restrict naval armaments which are offensive and costly. But I
do not believe that it is the program to deriy to a nation like
France, which has a large extent of coasts and a great number of
distant colonies, the essential means of defending its communications and its security.
" I am certain, my dear Mr. Hughes, that you will appreciate
the effort of conciliation which 've are making in order to respond
to your request.
"I beg you kindly to accept my cordial remembrances and the
ardent wish which I form for the complete and striking success of
the conference over which you preside with so n1uch authority and
brilliancy.
" BRIAND."

The chairman stated that he had understood the attitude of the
French Government in substance to be that it was not so much
preoccupied with the question of capital ships as it was concerned
with auxiliary vessels such as light cruisers, destroyers, and submarines. Capital ships were very costly and he had understood
that in this regard the ].,rench Government was willing to accept
a solution in the sense which he, as chairman, had des:red, but
that it could not accept a corresponding reduction with regard to
auxiliary craft.
'l,hen had followed a discussion of the desire voiced by Admiral
de Bon that France should have six instead of five capital ships
and that an arrangement should be reached with respect to auxiliary vessels before any decision was made concerning capital
ships. Admiral de Bon had submitted very complete and important figures in connection with France's replacement problem, tliP
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difficulties of constructing several ships at once in her dockyards,
and the consequent desire of the French Government to begin
building. in 1927 and to lay down one ship annually until the
French quota was filled.
There had been some question as to whether, in the corre
spondence passing between Mr. Briand and the chairman, Mr.
Briand had conditioned his acceptance of the capital-ship tonnage
proposed for France (175,000 tons) upon the making of a satisfactory adjustment with refere.nce to auxiliary combatant surface
craft and submarines or whether he had unconditionally accepted
the proposed capital-ship tonnage for France (175,000) but at the
same time had made a full reservation that such acceptance
should in no way prejudice the position as to auxiliary combatant
surface craft and submarines which the French might desire to
take. He (the chairman) had understood it in the latter sense.
He had not understood that it was in any way necessary to come
to an understanding with regard to lighter craft before reaching
an agreement concerning capital ships, but had understood that
nothing that was decided in regard to the capital-ship ratio
should be consi<;Iered as involving a concession as to auxiliary
vessels.
The chairman stated that he had had no desire to detract in
any manner from the French reservation or to build anything
upon a .phrase, but he had not thought it necessary to wait for
a decision regarding lesser craft before reaching a provisional
agreement on capital ships. Upon this point the subcommittee
had desired to know fully the views of the French delegatio·n.
When this point in the deliberations of the subcommitee had
been reached it was realized that it was not dealing with exclusively technical matters, and he had accordingly suggested that
there were no reasons why these discussions should not proceed
before the full committee, as many of the delegates not present
on the subcommittee would like to hear them. It was not necessary to be a naval expert-which he himself made no pretense
of being-in order to take part, and he felt a little reluctance at
having the discussions proceed while the other delegates were
absent. It had therefore been decided to continue the discussions in the full committee, inviting the technical naval experts
to sit with the delegations. This meeting had then been called.
The chairman stated further that he could not possibly do
justice to the elaborate statements made by Admiral de Bon,
who had presented detailed arguments in support of every phase
of the French Government's position. The chairman therefore
had .merely given an outline of the. whole situation and would not
attempt to go into details. He desired only to set forth the main
points, so that the commitee might have a basis upon which to
proceed. To sum up, therefore, his understanding was that France
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was ready to accept the limit of 175,000 tons for capital ships,
but distinctly reserved her decision with regard to auxiliary
vessels and submarines and was not willing to have her acceptance taken in any way as implying an agreement to a corresponding figure for auxiliary vessels.
The chairman then pointed out that the committee was uninformed with regard to what tonnage of lighter craft, destroyers,
submarines, etc., the French Government desired. He felt that a
statement from the French delegation on this point would now
be useful. In saying his, however• he, of course, did not wish to
foreclose discussion by others of the points he had already set
forth.
The chairman added that he regretted to find he had omitted
a point which should have been included in his review. It was
quite apparent that it was impossible to fQ_resee the future development of naYal construction and of scientific researches, or
what new political conditions might arise with relation to other
powers not represented here. Consequently the opinion had been ·
generally expressed that there should be another conference after
10 or after 7 years to reconsider questions that :r;night result
from new conditions produced through scientific or political developments or to deal with questions raised by or between powers
not represented at the conference here. This did not mean that
this present conference should not arrive at a decision fixing
definite points of agreement. It meant that the present gathering might provide for a later conference to consider new phases
and developments at a later date. He added that Mr. Balfour
had suggested that the American Government should prepare and
submit a draft statement regarding the calling of a new conference, and that this suggestion had been accepted.
In conclusion the chairman said that he thought he had now
reviewed all that was necessary and that he would accordingly
invite discussion.
Admiral de Bon said that he had nothing to add to the very
clear presentation that had just been made by the chairman;
he only asked permission to add a few words for the benefit of
the delegates who had not been present at the meetings of the
subcommittee in order to make entirely clear to them the spirit
of the French demands.
When the French delegation had been called upon to formulate their views on the program for the reconstruction of the
future force of France in capital ships, they had first pointed out
that the coefficient which had served as a basis for the future
naval forces of the British, Japanese, and American Navies could
not be used for calculating the future naval force necessary for
France.
25882-23--1
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The reason for this was obvious; this coefficient had been deduced from calculations based on the considerable increases in
the three navies, whereas the French Navy was in a situation
which demanded special consideration; it was far behind its normal program and even below its normal condition.
France had, in point of fact, already considerably reduced her
fleet, while, during the same period, the American Navy had
increased 48 per cent and the Japanese Navy 26 per cent. Before
the 'var Great Britain had been obliged to build, in order to meet
the threat of Germany; then the United States and Japan threw
themselves into that armament race which had been one of the
chief reasons for this conference. This coeffiCient could not,
then, with justice and equity, be applied to France; she must
suggest another method of calculation.
Her naval strength was at present composed of 10 vessels (including 3 predreadnaughts), the replacement of which was contemplated by France. As soon as she had been informed that predreadnaughts were not to be counted, she had agreed to limit herself to 7 ships.
France did not contemplate the immediate construction of a
fleet of 10 battleships of 35,000 tons, but only the adoption of a
program which would permit the replacement of the ships existing
to-day from time to time as they should become obsolete, in
accordance with the dates specified in the American scheme and
based upon the norn1al life of vessels. ,
Such 'a program could not be completed before 1941. France
could not allow herself to disappear :from the number of the maritime powers, but she had never had the intention of constructing
10 vessels within a short time; her program had in view a
gradual increase covering the period up to 1941, whic~ indicated
that her ambition was not inordinate .
.At the last session the F~ench delegation had finally agreed to
consider a substantial reduction of their demands, leaving France
with only 5 capital ships, with the reservation that they would
ask a reconsideration of the point by the delegation, since 5 vessels did not constitute a tactical unit, the minimum of the weakest
squadron that ever existed being 6 ships.
If France remained with only 5 ships, she would be practically
disarmed from a naval point of view; with 6 ships she would
be weak, but could still create a living organization.
The proposals which have been made by the French delegation,
in conformity with instructions received, were based upon the
ahove principles.
This enormous concession had been 1nade for the sake of the
success of the conference; it bad left France in a serious situation, anct it had as a consequence created the imperative need
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that she should have a greater number of light craft and submarines. Under these circumstances the French delegation believed the future constitution of the French fleet would have to be
considered as a whole and could not be divided into two partscapital ships on the one hand and light craft and submarines on
the other.
Such a method would be required not only for the French fleet
but for all the navies. The chairman had pointeq out that at this
juncture it would be desirable for France to make known her
requirements as to submarines and light craft; the French delegation were disposed to do so; correspondence was in progress
with the French Government, and a telegram was expected which
would make known the results· of the decisions reached. The
question was a very serious one, and before definite figures could
be presente~ they should receive the sanction of the Government.
If concessions should be demanded in the matter of_ light craft
and submarines, the great concession that had been made in regard to capital ships should be borne in mind an? the security of
France and the limitations of her normal naval existence should
not be lost sight of.
In considering the problem as a whole, the French delegation
were confronted by a question, raised by the British delegation, in
regard to the necessity for abolishing or retaining th~ submarine.
It appeared to the French delegation that in discussion this
matter took precedence over the others, since it might embarrass
their labors or nullify their results. It was desirable to make
rapid progress, and the delegation believed that the first thing to
do was to discuss the submarine question; this was the natural
sequence of things, and this question should be taken into ser:ous
consideration and be made the subject of a very frank debate.
In conclusion~ the French delegation desired to state its conviction that the discussion could not be pursued without taking into
account the question of submarines.
The chairman stated that he wished to make a suggestion in
order to a void t~e possibility of any misapprehension. The proposal made by the American Government at no time contained
any suggestio!} as to the exact number of ships any power might
build in replacement. It had said how many ships the United
States, Great Britain, and Japan should discard and how many
they should retain. The calculations regarding replacement were
based entirely on tonnage. What had been said regarding the
number of capital ships had simply been inferred from c·alculations based on the tonnage figures. It had not been stated in the
American proposal that the reduction to 175,000 tons for France
and Italy would limit them to five ships. That conclusion was a
deduction hy the French and Italian delegations. Using 35,000
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tons as the necessary size of a capital ship, it was evident that
the result would be five ships. But no country was required to
build vessels of that tonnage. The French Navy had at present
seven capital ships totaling 164,000 tons. There was no objection
to France having six or seven ships, or whatever number she desired. The chairman could understand the desire to have all ships
built of the maximum size, but that was a matter of preference
and vvas in no sense obligatory. He pointed out that there was
therefore no question as to the number of ships; it was a question
of tonnage only-a question of whether France should have
175,000 tons or should be allowed six ships of 35,000 tons, which
would mean a total of 210,000 tons.
The chairman then referred to Admiral de Bon's suggestion that
there should be a preliminary discussion regarding the abolishment of submarines. The committee greatly desired, he felt, to
proceed with the discussion concerning auxiliary craft as soon as
the French delegation \vere prepared to state what France desired
in that regard. Without such a statement there was nothing upon
which to proceed save the original American proposal. Italy desired equality with France, but the standard on which such
equality must be based \vas not before the committee. The com·mittee must therefore wait until the French delegatlon were ready
to present their particular proposal. After that the discussion
would continue.
Admiral de Bon said he desired to add but one word to what he
had already said. f-Ie did not believe it possible, when the question of the French Navy ~as considered, that anybody could believe Fr~nce so foolish as to construct small capital ships; that is
to say, those inferior to 35,000 tons. If France should later find
herself obliged to construct vessels of war-although she had not
yet expressed her intention of doing so-she must certainly build
vessels equal in strength to the capital ships of other navies. In
other \VOrds, to impose upon her a maximum of 175,000 tons WOUld
be equivalent to limiting her to five boats. With respect to this
"there could be
hesitation, he said, in the minds of properly informed persons. The total amount of tonnage must change,
whether they built five or whether they built the ·proper organic
force of six. Concerning these questions a certain delay had
arisen because lVIr. Briand \vas at the moment somewhere bet\veen
London and Paris and under such circumstances consultations
were difficult or impossible.- He now came, he said, to the question
of submarines. Whether they· were to be abolished or not, in
view of the fact that nothing could be done without clearing up
this point, he suggested that the matter should be taken up immediately; it would forward the work of the conference to do so.
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Lord Lee said that he rose to clear up an important point with
reference to the prospective conference to be held seven years
hence, or it might be earlier. The justification for the conference
arose from the inevitable development of technical aspects of the
naval problem, which might render technical decisions now made
either obsolete or inadequate. Among such technical questions
he put that of numbers as opposed to tonnage as a basis of calculation for capital ships. ~loreover, in seven years' ti~e 35,000
tons "legend draft" might prove no longer a useful rule as ~o the
limitation of individual capital ships. These questions of technical proportions he proposed should be left open for reconsideration at the future conference.
Senator Schanzer asked that he be allowed to make a few
remarks on the subject of future meetings. Italy, of course! was
in sympathy with the proposal for a meeting in seven years, and
could understand that it might be necessary to discuss and review
the work done at this conference. He suggested, however, but only
in an informal way, that room be left in the agreement for a
clause which would permit any one of the signatory powers to
ask for a meeting at any time prior to the conclusion of the
seven-year period. He pointed out that while scientific changes
were sure to take place, political changes were also quite possible. He was :oot thinking, he added, of Germany, since Germany would be held in' restraint by the terms of the treaty of
Versailles, but of Russia. No one knew what' Russia might do.
He suggested, therefore, that there be an agreement for a meeting in seven years, but that the right be reserved to call one at
an earlier date.
•
1.\Jr. Balfour questioned whether the moment was suitable for a
discussion on the question of the next conference. He understood that his own suggestion that the United States delegation
should draw up a resolution on the subject for later consideration had been acceptable for the purpose of giving effect to the
general policy of all the powers represented her~. He was sure
that the United States Government would consider the question
of the date from the point of view not only of possible technical
developments but also of those. considerations of international
polity which Senator Schanzer had very properly referred to.
He himself would prefer an interval of eight rather than seven
years, but perhaps it would be better to adjourn the discussion
until the proposal of the United States Government was available.
The chairman observed that a point had been reached where
the French delegation were not prepared to present a definite proposal with regard to lighter craft a~d desired a discussion of
the question of submarines, which it was understood the British
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Government desired to have abolished. The British delegation,
however, not having expected this subject to arise so soon, were
not yet ready to introduce it. If it would be convenient for the
members of the committee to meet at 3 o'clock that afternoon,
progress might be made with the submarine question. He wished
neither to hasten his colleagues unduly nor to take the responsibility of delaying the proceedings w~en there was so much to be
discussed.
Mr. Sarraut said that the French delegation would raise no
difficulties with respect to holding a session of the committee
during the afternoon, but in regard to the definite statements referred to by Mr. Hughes they could not undertake to have the
matters in question ready. The reason was obvious. Mr. Briand
was to arrive in Paris that afternoon. It had been impossible to
keep him informed with respect to the negotiations here. Ahvays·
faithful to France's aim of seeking to reconcile opposing views,
an accord was looked for which would satisfy the United States
and the other powers. He could say that the French program
would be carefully revised, but with respect to the second part .of
t~e ,q pestion-i. e., that concerning submarines and auxiliary
ships-although their views had been transmitted to Paris they
could not act \Vithout the approval of the French Government.
They expected to receive an early answ:er, but in the natural
course of things t~is could not be expected during the afternoon.
This was because Mr. Briand was only then leaving London and
would be obliged to consult on his arrival with the French minister 'tll of marine. With these reservations he accepted the proposal of a meeting that afternoon. Or, if the British delegation so
desired and 'vere ready to proceed, the French delegation were
ready to continue immediately with the discussion of the submarine question.
The chairman remarked that as the information necessary
would soon be available and as the conference now had its attention focused on the naval question, to break away from this and
return to far-eastern questions would interrupt proceedings and
cause an unfortunate delay. While not wishing in any way to
hurry his colleagues and while, of course, there should be a full
opportunity for consultation and consideration, it would seem
that the committee should meet again promptly in order to make
progress. He, therefore, merely wished to inquire whether it
would be more convenient to meet that afternoon or the following
morning.
That afternoon at 3 o'clock was the time agreed upon.
The chairman suggested that the communiqu~ should state that
the progress already made in -the subcommittee had been reported
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to this committee, which had then discussed the matter and adjourned to continue the discussion that afternoon at 3 o'clock.
The meeting adjourned at 12.45 p. m. until December 22, 1921,
3 p.m.

FIFTH MEETING, THURSDAY, DECEMBER 22, 1921, 3 P. M.
PRESENT.

United States.-NI.r. Hughes, Senator Lodge, Mr. Root, Senator
Underwood, Col. Roosevelt, Admiral Coontz. Accompanied by
Mr. Wright and l\Ir. Clark.
British Ernpire.-~Ir. Balfour, Lord Lee, Sir Auckland Geddes,
Rear Admiral Sir E. Chatfield, Sir Robert Borden (for Canada),
Senator Pearce (for Australia), Sir John Salmond (for New
Zealand), l\Ir. Sastri (for India). Accompanied by Sir Maurice
Hankey, Capt. J.,ittle, Capt. Domvile, Mr. Flint.
France.--:--:l\Ir. Sarraut, Mr. Jusserand, Vice Admiral de Bon.
Accompanied by Mr. Kammerer, Mr. Denaint, Capt. Oden'hal,
Mr. Ponsot.
Jtaly.-Senator Schanzer, Senator Rolandi-Ricci, Senator Albertini, Vice Admiral Baron Acton. Accompanied by Marquis
Visconti-Venosta, Count Pagliano, Commander Prince Ruspoli, Mr.
Celesia di Vegliasco.
Japan.-Prince Tokugawa, Mr. Hanihara, Vice Admiral Kato,
Capt. Uyeda. Accompanied by Mr. lchihashi a.nd Commander
Hori. ·
The secretary general, assisted by Mr. Paul and Mr. Osborne.
Interpreter, l\lr. Camerlynck.
1. The fifth meeting of the Committee on Limitation of Armament was held in the Columbus Room of the Pan American
Union Building at 3 p. m. Thursday, December 22, 1921.
2. The following· were present: For the United States, Mr.
Hughes, Senator Lodge, Mr. Root, Senator Underwood, Col.
Roosevelt, Admiral Coontz; for the British Empire, Mr. Balfour,
Lord Lee, Sir Auckland Geddes, Rear Admiral Sir· E. Chatfield,
Sir Robert Borden (for Canada), Senator Pearce (for Australia), Sir John Salmond (for New Zealand), Mr. Sastri (for
India) ; for France, 1\Ir. Sarraut, 1\Ir. Jusserand, Vice Admiral
de Bon; for Italy, Senator Schanzer, Senator Rolandi-Ricci,
Senator Albertini; Vice Admiral Acton; for Japan, Prince Tokugawa, l\Ir. Hanihara, Vice Admiral l(ato, Capt. Uyeda.
~- Secretaries and advisers present included: For the United
States, l\Ir. Wright, 1\Ir. Clark; for the British Empire, Sir
1\Iaurice flankey, Capt. Little, Capt. Domvile, ' Mr. Flint; for
France, ::\Ir. Kammerer, 1\Ir. Denaint, Capt. Odend'hal, Mr. Pon-

